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This paper compares different just transition pathways in China, the European Union
and the United States of America by comparing the current state of the coal sector and
just transition policies away from coal. How can social justice in the energy transition be
achieved under different models of energy governance? Since these three blocs have
only made some progress on just transition policies and legislations for workers and
communities impacted by the coal phase down or phase out in recent years, there have
not been many studies comparing them to each other. The analysis in this paper shows
that while all three blocs work towards ensuring the integration of coal workers and coal
communities into the clean economy in the process of coal reduction, their approaches
to achieving a just transition differ in terms of policy frameworks, financing resources,
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Abstract:
This paper compares different just transition pathways in China, the European Union and the
United States of America by comparing the current state of the coal sector and just transition
policies away from coal. How can social justice in the energy transition be achieved under different
models of energy governance? Since these three blocs have only made some progress on just
transition policies and legislations for workers and communities impacted by the coal phase down
or phase out in recent years, there have not been many studies comparing them to each other. The
analysis in this paper shows that while all three blocs work towards ensuring the integration of coal
workers and coal communities into the clean economy in the process of coal reduction, their
approaches to achieving a just transition differ in terms of policy frameworks, financing resources,
specific measures and public participation.
This paper is part of a series of FEEM working papers of comparison studies of China, the EU
and the US in the field of climate and energy.
Key words: Energy Transition, Just Transition, Coal Phase Out, Inclusiveness, China, the
European Union, the United States.
1. Introduction
It is a global consensus that coal power generation is the largest contributor to global warming and
the main obstacle to achieving the Paris Agreement to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C
compared to pre-industrial levels by the 21st century. However, coal is still the primary source of
power generation: in 2020, coal represented 35% of the power generation mix (IEA, 2021a). Prior
to the Covid-19 pandemic, coal-fired power generation accounted for 30% of global CO2
emissions in 2018 (IEA, 2020). While the pause in economic activities hit demand for coal during
the early stage of the pandemic, global coal use is expected to have picked up again in 2021 and
drive global CO2 emissions up by around 640 Mt of CO2, due in large part to a rapid increase in
coal use for power generation in Asia (IEA, 2021b).
Currently, countries are being urged to step up their efforts to reduce emissions from coal power
generation. Since the Paris Agreement in 2015, 76% of proposed coal power plants have been
cancelled, which totalled 1,175 GW of capacity. (Littlecott et al., 2021). COP26 in Glasgow, the
United Kingdom in late 2021 saw another milestone in a “no coal future”: 46 countries, including
23 new committers signed the Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement, which pledges to phase
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out unabated coal power in the 2030s for major economies and in the 2040s globally, while
“ceasing issuance of new permits for new unabated coal-fired power generation projects”. 1
Nevertheless, the exit of coal power is much more than rhetoric. The transition of the coal sector
is not simply an ambitious story of environmental sustainability: the closure of coal mines and
power plants can have significant negative economic and social consequences for countries or
regions dependent on energy-intensive industries, and this can happen before the energy transition
creates new and additional opportunities and jobs. Calling a halt to the construction of new plants
may be relatively easy to achieve, yet reducing emissions from existing assets is far from a paper
exercise, which may require considerable political will, financial input and social support (IEA,
2021c). In the world today, there are approximately 8,500 coal power plants in operation that
generate 2,000 GW of electricity, accounting for more than a third of all electricity (Birol & Malpass,
2021). Behind these figures are stakeholders in all parts of the coal chain, including coal workers
(serving for extraction, transportation, processing, etc.), and their families, coal-dependent
communities and corporations.
Policymakers are being tested by the development of public policies that ensure justice and fairness
in the energy transition and the inclusion of those people and communities most affected by the
transition of the coal sector. In the meantime, the concept of “just transition”, which refers to the
goals of “decent work for all, social inclusion and the eradication of poverty” when transitioning
towards an environmentally sustainable economy (International Labour Organization, 2015), is
being mentioned more frequently in coal sector policies.
How can we ensure a just transition away from coal and create an inclusive energy future for all
stakeholders? There is no universal standard here - strategies and policies are diverse, taking into
account the economic, social and environmental realities of different countries or regions. China,
the European Union and the United States are the top three economies aiming for net-zero
emissions (Froggatt & Quiggin, 2021), and they are, or were, the world’s top coal power-using geoeconomic blocs. China is currently the world’s biggest coal consumer with a large coal industry
and a significant number of stakeholders in various regions. The EU proposed in the European
Green Deal to become the world’s first climate-neutral continent by 2050 through clean energy
transition and a circular economy. 50% of coal plants in Europe have been closed since the Paris
Agreement, but there are still coal-reliant members who are reluctant to commit to coal plant
decommissioning (Bloomberg, 2021). The US is the world’s third-largest coal consumer who has
closed around 25% of its coal capacity in the past decade. However, coal still “retains its political
power”, especially from those coal-producing states (Storrow, 2021). The past and ongoing coal
phase out efforts of these three blocs can bring a wealth of policy lessons and implications on a
just transition away from coal.
This paper analyses and compares the just transition policies away from coal in China, the EU and
the US, with a focus on policies related to coal industry workers and coal-reliant communities.
This paper aims to compare different strategies for achieving a just transition away from coal in
China, the EU and the US. While there are a number of separate analyses that examine the just
coal sector transition in China, the EU and the US, the comparative path helps see at a glance the
policy choices of different countries or regions in different political and economic contexts, and
thus to better grasp the complexity of just and inclusive transitions.

1

UN Climate Change Conference UK 2021, https://ukcop26.org/global-coal-to-clean-power-transition-statement/
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This paper is part of a series of FEEM working papers of comparison studies of China, the EU
and the US in the field of climate and energy. Topics in this series of papers include comparisons
of decarbonization of the power sector (Noussan et al., 2021), energy and climate governance (Lu
et al., 2022), power battery securities (Campbell et al., 2022), the security of rare earth minerals
(Raimondi et al., 2022) and just transition strategies away from coal presented in this paper.
2. Coal sector profiles of China, the EU and the US: National Strategies, Coal Regions
and People
2.1 Coal profiles of China, the EU and the US
A synthesis of some indicators related to the basics of social economy and the coal sector to
compare China, the EU and the US is reported in Table 1. Although all three blocs have more or
less proposed responses to decarbonization and climate change by moving away from coal, Table
1 presents a very different picture of the present coal sector, their various levels of dependence on
coal, and the implied challenges of achieving a just energy transition away from coal.
Table 1 - Key indicators on the coal sector in China, the EU and the US
China*

2019

Country
1,398

European
Union**
Union of countries
448

Billion
USD
%

2019

14,280

15,626

21,433

2019

5.95

1.765

2.161

Total electricity generation 5
Coal and electricity

TWh

2019

7,503.4

2,892.5

4,411.2

Electricity generation by coal 6
Share of coal in the electricity
generation mix 7
Coal power capacity in
operation 8
Coal power stations in
operation 9

TWh

2019

4,849.7

475.1

1,051.1

%

2019

64.6

16.4

23.8

MW

As of July 2021

1,046,893

117,749

232,772

No.

As of July 2021

1,087

224

246

Total population
Total GDP

2

3

GDP growth rate 4

Type
Million

Date

United States***
Country
328

2

World Bank Data, Total population, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
World Bank Data, Nominal GDP, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
4
World Bank Data, GDP growth (annual %),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=US
5
BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/businesssites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf
6
BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/businesssites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf
7
The calculation of this indicator is based on the result of dividing electricity generation by coal by Total electricity
generation.
8
Global Energy Monitor: Coal Plants by Region (MW), Coal Plants by Country (MV),
https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/summary-tables/
9
Global Energy Monitor: Coal Plants by Region (Power Stations), Coal Plants by Country (Power Stations),
https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/summary-tables/
3
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Coal power capacity
MW
announced, pre-permit, or
permitted 10
Coal power stations preNo.
construction, or
construction 11
Coal power and CO2 emissions
Mt
Annual CO2 emitted (for
plants under operation)

163,342

500

0

As of July 2021

238

4

0

As of July 2021

4,518

595

1,138

As of July 2021

129,581

5,583

9,392

2019

931.6

1,252.4

1,082.7

No.

As of June 2021

297

33

48

No.

As of June 2021

126

0

12

12

Lifetime CO2 emitted (for
plants under operation)

As of July 2021

Mt

13

CO2 emissions per unit of
electricity generated by coal 14
Coal mines
Number of major coal mines
in operation 15
Number of major coal mines
proposed 16

g/kWh

* Excluding the 2 Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau) and 1 disputed region (Taiwan).
** The European Union considered in this study is the EU-27, after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) on Jan 31st , 2020.
*** Excluding District of Columbia.

2.2 Challenges in China’s coal sector
One of the biggest obstacles to achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 in China, the country with the
world’s largest population, is its huge dependence on coal. The Chinese government is making a
commitment to phase down coal to promote its own economic transformation as well as
responding to international pressure to tackle climate change. In its latest released Action Plan for
Carbon Dioxide Peaking Before 2030, China aims to “strictly and rationally limit the increase in coal
consumption over the 14th Five-Year Plan period and phase it down in the 15th Five-Year Plan
period (National Development and Reform Commission, 2021)”. With Chinese President Xi
Jinping pledging to stop building overseas coal power plants, expectations are still high as to when
China will signal a halt to the construction of coal power plants at home. The decline in the share
10

Global Energy Monitor, Coal Plants by Region (MW), Coal Plants by Country (MV),
https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/summary-tables/
11
Global Energy Monitor, Coal Plants by Region (Power Stations), Coal Plants by Country (Power Stations),
https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/summary-tables/
12
Global Energy Monitor, Coal Plants by Region: Annual CO2, Coal Plants by Country, Annual CO2,
https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/summary-tables/
13
Global Energy Monitor, Coal Plants by Region: Lifetime CO2, Coal Plants by Country, Lifetime CO2,
https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/summary-tables/
14
The calculation of this indicator is based on the result of dividing Annual CO2 emitted (for plants under
operation) by electricity generation by coal (2019).
15
Global Energy Monitor, Number of Major Mines by Region, Number of Major Mines by Country,
https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-mine-tracker/summary-tables/
16
Global Energy Monitor, Number of New Mines by Region, Number of New Mines by Country,
https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-mine-tracker/summary-tables/
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of coal in the electricity generation mix in recent years has also shown a positive trend in China’s
move away from coal: between 2016 and 2020, the share of coal consumption fell from 65.51%
to 60.75% (Our World in Data, 2021).
However, nearly two-thirds of electricity generation comes from coal, a much higher figure than
in the EU and the US, where coal accounts for only 16.4% and 23.8% of their power portfolios.
Over the past few decades, the reliability of coal resources for power generation and its
affordability have been one of the main contributors to China’s emergence as “the world’s factory”,
and also the world’s second-largest economy, while the fact that China’s economy still maintains
medium-to-high growth rates (5.95% GDP growth in 2019 and 2.3% positive growth in 2020
during the global pandemic 17) seems to indicate that coal’s position as China’s primary energy
source will be difficult to shake anytime soon. Compared to the EU and the US, China has not
only much higher coal power capacity in operation, but also 163,342 MW of planned new coal
power plant capacity. At the same time, the data in Table 1 illustrates that China releases less CO2
per unit of electricity generated by coal than the EU and the US since the average age of coal
power plants in China is much lower than in the EU and the US (Myllyvirta, et al., 2020). The fact
that Chinese coal power plants have a younger age and higher thermal efficiency may make the
their being phased out in a short time more economically unacceptable. High coal prices and power
outages in 2021 have warned the Chinese authorities of the need to focus on energy security
aspects in their decarbonization strategy as “ensuring security” and “enhancing supply” are
frequently mentioned in high-level meetings and policy documents. In a statement made by the
Chinese premier, Li Keqiang after a meeting of Beijing’s National Energy Commission, China will
continue to “construct advanced coal power according to development needs”. 18
In addition to the economic realities, another challenge for China to move away from coal is a
large number of provinces and regions with coal industries, the large number of people working
with coal and the communities associated with the coal industry. Shanxi, Inner Mongolia and
Shaanxi are the three provincial-level coal mining regions in China and their local economy is
highly dependent on resource-based industries. In the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, for
example, the share of enterprises in energy-intensive industries in the region’s industries above the
scale is nearly 50%, and energy and raw material industries account for 87.2% of the added value
of industries above the scale (Xu, 2021). Under the pressure of the central government to achieve
carbon peaking by 2030 19, the control of total energy consumption and energy use intensity (能效
双 控) 20, the major coal-producing regions are trying to get rid of the path dependence on fossil
energy economy and seek industrial transformation.
The employees of the coal industry are the most affected group. The decade from 2002 to 2012 is
known as the “Golden Decade” of rapid development of the coal industry in China, along with
17

World Bank Data, GDP growth (annual %), China,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN
18
Based on a statement made by the Chinese premier, Li Keqiang after a meeting of Beijing’s National Energy
Commission, http://www.scio.gov.cn/tt/34849/Document/1714397/1714397.htm
19
On September 22, 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced at the 75th session of the United Nations
General Assembly that China will achieve carbon peaking by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060,
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-09/22/content_5638597.htm
20
The control of total energy consumption and energy use intensity was introduced by the NDRC in 2021 to
promote energy conservation, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/tzgg/202109/P020210916534072411763.pdf
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high production, soaring prices and profits, and the number of employees increased from 3.77
million to a peak of 5.3 million (China Coal, 2020). However, over the 13th Five-Year Plan period
(2016-2020), due to the “cutting overcapacity” for key industries directive under the supply side
reform 21, around a total of 5,500 coal mines and more than 1 billion tons of coal production
capacity was shut down (Xinhua News, 2021). Meanwhile, the number of employees in China’s
coal industry has dropped from nearly 4.5 million in 2015 to about 2.6 million in March 2020
(China Coal, 2020). Furthermore, the increased efficiency of coal power production is expected to
result in less demand for employees: the number of employees needed for 10,000 tons of coal in
China fell from 55 in 1990 to less than 10 people in 2020 (China Coal, 2020). When industrial
transformation occurs along with technological advances, it will be a dilemma to protect the people
and communities affected by the industry and to promote the clean energy transition away from
coal.
2.3 The complexity of coal phase out for coal regions in the European Union
The EU proposed in the European Green Deal to become the world’s first climate-neutral
continent by 2050 through a clean energy transition and circular economy. To meet the goal of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% below 1990 levels by 2030 22, the rapid phase out of
coal and the application of clean technologies is key to decarbonizing the energy system at a low
cost. Currently, the EU’s share of coal in the electricity generation mix is only 16.4%, the lowest
among the three blocs of China, the EU and the US, and the EU’s total coal generation has fallen
by nearly one-third since 2012 (European Commission, 2021a). In addition, the operating coal
capacity in the EU is only nearly 50% of that in the US and only 11.2% of that in China.
Many EU countries have responded to the EU’s climate ambitions by laying out timelines for coal
decommission before or after the introduction of the European Green Deal. As shown in Table
2, by December 2021, four of the 27 EU member states have already achieved a coal-free electricity
mix, six have committed to phase out coal by 2025, four have committed to close coal plants by
2030, and five pledged to remove coal by 2050. A further two countries are still discussing the coal
phase out agenda, while six countries have coal not in their electricity generation mix in the first
place.
Table 2 - EU member states’ coal phat out schedule
Category
Coal-free as
of December
2021
Phase out by
2025

Country
Belgium
Austria
Sweden
Portugal
France

Year of
phase out
2016
2020
2020
2021
2022

Announcement
The last coal power plant was closed in March 2016.
The last coal power plant was closed in April 2020.
The last coal power plant was closed in April 2020.
The last coal power plant was closed in November 2021.
Announced by President Macron in 2017 and was included in
the Energy and Climate Bill in 2019.

21

According to the State Council, cutting overcapacity is a method of seeking to transform and upgrade production
facilities and products in order to address the oversupply of products, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/201603/11/content_5052097.htm
22
This is mentioned in the EU’s 2030 Climate Target Plan, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/european-greendeal/2030-climate-target-plan_en
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Phase out by
2030

Phase out
before 2050

Under
discussion

No coal in
electricity
generation
mix

Slovakia

2023

Hungary

2025

Italy

2025

Ireland

2025

Greece

2025

Finland
Netherlands

2029
2030

Spain

2030

Denmark

2030

Romania
Croatia
Slovenia
Germany

2032
2033
2033
2038
(2030)

Poland

2049

Czech
Republic

Earlier
than 2038
proposed
2035, 2038,
2040
proposed

Bulgaria

The Environment Minister declared 2023 as the target year for
Slovakia’s coal phase out in 2017.
Announced by Hungary’s secretary of state for EU affairs in
2021.
Announced in the National Energy Strategy by the Italian
Government in 2017.
Announced by the Irish minister for communications, climate
action and environment in 2018.
Announced by Greece’s Secretary General for Energy and
Mineral Resources at Ministry for the Environment and Energy
in 2021.
Confirmed by Finland’s environment minister in 2018.
Confirmed in a law adopted in 2019 banning the coal use for
electricity generation as of 1 January 2030 at latest.
Spain joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance to set a date for
closing all coal plants by 2030 in 2021.
Confirmed by an energy agreement is unanimously approved by
Parliament in 2018.
Confirmed in the official recovery plan set up in 2021.
Announced by the Croatian Prime Minister in 2021.
Announced by Slovenia’s infrastructure minister in 2021.
Confirmed in the Act to Reduce and End Coal-Powered Energy
and Amend Other Laws entering into force in 2020.
The new German Government, inaugurated in December 2021,
has declared its intention to phase out coal by 2030.
Confirmed in an agreement signed with the coal mining industry
by Poland’s government and unions in 2021.
A recommendation was sent by the Czech government to phase
out coal by 2038 to the state commission.
The National Assembly of Bulgaria will choose from 2035, 2038
or 2040 as a deadline to phase out coal.

Cyprus
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta

Sources: Europe Beyond Coal, EU Coal Exit Timeline, https://beyond-coal.eu/coal-exit-timeline/
European Commission, Coal in Europe’s energy mix, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/EU-coal-regions/coalregions-transition_en#coal-in-europe-s-energy-mix

Overall, the position of coal is rapidly declining in the EU countries. However, the EU is not
ironclad as far as coal phase out is concerned, since there are some countries in the EU that have
so far heavily relied on coal for their electricity generation, most of them in Central, Eastern and
Southeastern Europe. As Table 3 shows, Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic are the top
coal producers in the EU in 2019, whose coal production reached 1.87 EJ, 1.19 EJ and 0.56 EJ in
2019. Table 4 presents that in the same year, five EU countries have a coal share of more than 25%
of their power generation mix, namely Slovenia (28.01%), Germany (28.4%), Czech Republic
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(44.15%), Bulgaria (39.71%) and Poland (73.08%). Correspondingly, these are also the countries
that have committed to the coal phase out late or are still under discussion.
Table 3 – The eight EU member states with the highest coal production in 2019
Country

Year of coal
phase out

Country

Year of coal
phase out

Coal production
(Exajoules [EJ])

Hungary

2025

0.04

Germany

2038

1.19

Greece

2025

0.21

Poland

2049

1.87

Spain

2030

0.07

Czech Republic

Not confirmed

0.56

Romania

2032

Coal production
(Exajoules [EJ])

Bulgaria
Not confirmed 0.20
0.16
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-ofworld-energy.html

Table 4 - The share of coal in the electricity generation mix in non-coal free EU member states
in 2019
Country

Year of coal
phase out

The share of coal
in the electricity
generation mix in
2019 (%)

Country

Year of coal
phase out

France
Slovakia
Hungary
Italy
Ireland
Greece
Finland

2022
2023
2025
2025
2025
2025
2029

0.78
8.82
11.63
6.78
1.95
24.43
6.64

Denmark
Romania
Croatia
Slovenia
Germany
Poland
Czech
Republic
Bulgaria

2030
2032
2033
2033
2038
2049
Not confirmed

The share of
coal in the
electricity
generation mix
in 2019 (%)
14.10
22.88
12.91
28.01
28.40
73.08
44.15

Netherlands
2030
14.57
Not confirmed 39.71
Spain
2030
4.51
Source: Our World in Data based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy & Ember (2021), https://ourworldindata.org/electricitymix

In the coal-reliant Central and Eastern EU countries, which are often accompanied by coal, steel,
energy or coal chemical-based clusters, the drawdown of the coal industry often has regional and
social implications and associated job losses (Kustova et al., 2021). In Poland, obstacles to reducing
coal production and consumption have come from different actors, including coal companies,
trade unions, civil society and the government as well as their coalition, which has kept Poland
from making the difficult commitment to retire coal in 2049 until 2021 (Brauers & Oei, 2020).
Coal has a long history in Poland, with around 90,000 workers still employed in the coal mining
industry until 2020. Convincing stakeholders that the energy transition has the prospect of
prosperity in looking for alternative career paths is crucial for the EU. 23 Also, coal communities
represent a large number of political votes - which has often divided the Polish government in
23

This is based on the speech given by Frans Timmermans, the Executive Vice-President of European
Commission, at COP26 high-level roundtable on international just transition: “If your prospects are just prospects
of loss, loss of your job, loss of the economic structure where you come from, you will resist change, even if you
know that the situation you are in is not sustainable”, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/20192024/timmermans/announcements/frans-timmermans-cop26-high-level-roundtable-international-just-transition_en
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terms of ending coal (Wiech, 2020). The drive to move away from coal in search of a more
sustainable economy has emerged in some municipalities, but the intricate restructuring has not
been accomplished by most governments at the central level since 1989 (World Wide Fund for
Nature, 2020; Harper, 2020). Poland lags in its pledge to end its dependence on coal as its main
energy source and is also one of the leading countries to veto EU policies against climate change,
reflecting Poland’s willingness to take on its coal industry (Jan-kowska, 2017). Moreover, spiking
energy and electricity prices in Europe in 2021 are also dampening confidence in decommissioning
coal plants in EU countries that rely on coal power.
Nevertheless, coal is increasingly becoming less of an economic option for these countries. Rising
carbon pricing is having an impact on reducing coal-fired power generation: the ETS, which is
expected to reach 65 euros per tonne of CO2 equivalent by 2030, will impose higher costs on coal
use. Support for coal will also become increasingly fragile in the political and investment spheres
(Kustova et al., 2021). Demographically speaking, the phase out of coal may not only be a challenge
but also an opportunity for industrial workers and coal regions - they may be a pool of labor for
key EU industries where labor is becoming scarce.
2.4 Regional coal reduction issues in the United States
The United States has a long history of coal. It has the highest proven coal reserves in the world
and is currently the world’s third-largest coal consumer. As of 2019, there are 1,134 active mines
in the US, which produced 706 million short tons in the same year (Statista, 2021). This number
has been declining since the mid-2000s as the demand for coal for electricity generation has
dropped (Energy Information Administration, 2021a). In 2019, coal-fired generating units in the
US produced 966,000GWh of electricity, reaching the lowest level since 1976, and this accounted
for around 23.2% of the generation mix, which is higher than the EU but much lower than China
(EIA, 2020).
However, though due to the rise in gas prices, the US coal generation is expected to increase in
2021 (EIA, 2021b), it is a fact that coal has declined rapidly in the US over the past decade. As
shown in Table 1, a significant difference between the US and China and the EU is that there are
no more coal power plants under construction or planned in the US. It was economic rather than
political reasons that led to this (Uhler, 2021). Weak electricity demand, the large availability of
natural gas, which has become cheaper and more accessible due to fracking, becoming the choice
for power generation for utilities, and the declining cost of renewable energy have all contributed
to the closure of coal power plants in the US (Storrow, 2021; Uhler, 2021). Former President
Trump used the revival of the coal industry as his electoral weapon to attract votes from coal
communities that felt they had been abandoned by political groups that support the transition. He
pursued a number of policies to revive the coal industry during his term, e.g., reviewing the Clean
Power Plan formed during the Obama administration with an aim to tackle climate change, waiving
reviews required by the National Environmental Policy Act (EPA), publishing the Affordable Clean
Energy (ACE) which might extend the lives of coal power units and coal-fired power plants, and
reducing the royalty rates for fossil fuels, etc (Gruenspecht, 2019). However, none of these
attempts has been able to redeem the decline in US coal. During Trump’s term, around 15% of
the coal power capacity in the US was eliminated (Lipton, 2020).
The Biden administration has placed tackling climate change at the center of its national security
and plans to restart the review of existing permits for fossil fuels development (Barsotti, 2021). In
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August 2021, the Biden administration announced an intent to conduct “a formal review of coal
sales on federal lands” to analyze its impact on climate change and the interests of taxpayers
(Bureau of Land Management, 2021). However, though President Biden plans to return the US to
international leadership in the global efforts against climate change, the United States did not join
the Global Coal To Clean Power Transition Statement in COP26. In the unique political system of the
United States, coal still retains considerable political power in the country, especially when senators
from coal-reliant states have swing votes in the Senate (Storrow, 2011). A recent example might
be the Biden administration’s Clean Electricity Performance Program (CEPP), which would have
spent USD 150 billion in subsidies on clean energy to move away from fossil fuels and achieve its
emissions reduction vision, was “scrapped from reconciliation” in late 2021 after Senator Joe
Manchin, a swing-vote from the coal-dependent state of West Virginia opposed it (Davenport,
2021; Dumain, 2021).
Table 5 – Share of coal in the electricity generation mix in 9 states in 2019 and 2020
State

Share of coal in the
State
Share of coal in the
electricity generation
electricity generation
mix in 2019 (%)
mix in 2020 (%)
Nebraska
55
Nebraska
51 (↓)
Indiana
59
Indiana
53 (↓)
North Dakota
63
North Dakota
57 (↓)
Utah
64
Utah
62 (↓)
Kentucky
73
Kentucky
69 (↓)
Missouri
73
Missouri
71 (↓)
Wyoming
84
Wyoming
80 (↓)
West Virginia
91
West Virginia
88 (↓)
Montana
52
Montana
36 (↓)
Source: New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/28/climate/how-electricity-generation-changed-in-yourstate-election.html?searchResultPosition=1
Nuclear Energy Institution: https://www.nei.org/resources/statistics/state-electricity-generation-fuel-shares

Wyoming, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania are the top three coal-producing states in the US,
accounting for 59% of the total coal production (EIA, 2021a). Meanwhile, as shown in Table 5, in
2019, coal accounts for more than 50% of the electricity generation mix in 9 states: Nebraska,
Indiana, North Dakota, Utah, Kentucky, Missouri, Wyoming, West Virginia, Montana. In 2020,
this figure became 8. At the same time, while the reliance on coal for electricity generation
remained high in these states, their proportions still fell in absolute terms compared to 2019. Coal
phase out is now a main challenge for some states, however, even in the coal-oriented states, it is
falling out of favour (Tsafos, 2021). The falling status of coal brought with it the decline of coal
communities, the sluggishness of the economies of coal-centric states, and massive job losses
among coal industry workers. As Graph 1 presents, the total number of employees in the US coal
mining industry has continued to decline rapidly over the last decade. This explains the discontent
among unemployed workers in the coal industry and why both Trump and Biden have made
helping unemployed workers get back to work and ensuring justice in the economic transformation
a key point of their election campaign. The decline of the coal industry also has a disruptive impact
on local economies. For example, Boone County, West Virginia, used to generate surpluses from
state taxes levied on coal companies. But budget deficits, population outflows, and severe cuts in
public benefits and jobs occurred after coal company bankruptcies (Energywire, 2020).

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1355

12

Zhu et al.: Towards An Inclusive Energy Transition Beyond Coal - A compa

Graph 1 - Total amount of employees in coal mining in the US (2011-2020) (Thousands)

Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CEU1021210001

3. Just transition policies away from coal in China, the EU and the US
The section above gives an overall picture of the coal sector in China, the EU and the US. Given
these analyses, the following section will specify the just transition policies in China, the EU and
the US away from coal.
3.1 China
Ensuring “just transition” as one priority in energy and climate governance has attracted the
attention of the highest levels of Chinese government leadership. At the Leaders Summit on
Climate convened by the US President Biden in 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping mentioned
that China should “explore synergies between environmental protection and economic
development, job creation and poverty eradication, and achieve social justice in the process of
green transformation”. 24 Social justice is inextricably linked to equal employment opportunities for
all in Chinese authorities’ philosophy. As Chinese Premier Li Keqiang stated in the 2021 Report on
the Work of the Government, “Employment is pivotal to people’s wellbeing”, and stabilizing
employment and ensuring living standards (“稳就业，保民生”) is the focus of China’s current
economic development (Li, 2021).
Chinese policymakers have long recognized that a decline in the coal industry would cause
significant social and economic hardship, particularly in regions where coal is a major industry.
Back at the beginning of the supply-side reform and cutting overcapacity directives in early 2016,
the central government gave a number of proposals on employees’ placement. The 13th Five-Year
Plan for Coal Industry Development (2016-2020) points out the shortcomings of China’s coal industry,
including “the large gap between per capita work efficiency of China and that of advanced coalproducing countries” and “defective closure and phase out mechanisms of coal mines, difficulties
in employees’ resettlement, etc” (NDRC, National Energy Administration, 2016). According to
24

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at the Leaders Summit on Climate, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/202104/22/content_5601508.htm
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the Plan, the Ministry of Finance has set up a special fund of RMB 100 billion for “industrial
enterprise restructuring” in the steel and coal industries. This special fund was partly allocated to
local governments through fiscal transfers and partly used to directly support state-owned
enterprises. Of the RMB 100 billion, 80% was allocated as a basic subsidy based on the amount of
cutting overcapacity tasks (weighted at 50%), the number of workers to be resettled (weighted at
30%) and the degree of financial difficulties (weighted at 20%). The remaining 20% of the special
funding will be used to reward regions or SOEs that exceed their targets (Ministry of Finance,
2016). To remove low-quality over-capacity fast, some of the funds were required to be subsidised
directly to employees whose labour contracts had been terminated or internally retired due to the
closure of coal mines or the shutdown of coal enterprises as financial compensation (NDRC, 2016),
which was intended to alleviate social problems in the process of cutting overcapacity (China Coal,
2020).
The central government has set high expectations for the social impact of cutting overcapacity. In
May 2016, when Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited the Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security, he made it clear that “zero-employment households (零就业 家庭)” would not be
allowed to emerge as a result of cutting overcapacity. 25 Due to the bureaucratic target responsibility
system and the top-down performance assessment system between the central government and
local governments in China, the requirement from the State Council has put significant pressure
on localities (Lu et al., 2021). Since 2017, the pace and quality of “employees’ resettlement and
social stability” have been increasingly emphasised to make the cutting overcapacity campaign
more socially affordable. Several measures are mentioned in the guidance on cutting overcapacity
in key areas from 2018 to 2020 issued by ministries including NDRC, Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology, National Energy Administration, etc., and in the practices by local
governments in response to the requirement of the central government:
● Divert employees through multiple channels to positions that could be resettled (within or
beyond the original enterprise) and subsidize enterprises that lay off employees relatively
less;
● Encourage job transition, including holding special recruitment activities for workers to be
resettled, providing vocational guidance, employment services and vocational training for
workers to be diverted;
● Promote entrepreneurship, including providing entrepreneurship training for workers with
the will to start their own businesses and utilize the local entrepreneurship incubation
systems;
● Implement internal retirement for eligible workers and enterprises issue living expenses
and pay the relevant social security, or formally retire workers if ages reach;
● Develop multi-channel funding to solve the problem of enterprises defaulting on social
insurance premiums, promote timely payment of unemployment insurance benefits to
eligible unemployed persons, strengthening the function of government-backed protection
and ensuring the basics of employees’ livelihood;

25

Statement by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang during his May 2016 tour of the Ministry of Human Services and Social
Security, http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2016-05-09/1003474.html.
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● Use public service jobs to help increase support for people with employment difficulties
(e.g., “4050” group 26) and zero-employment households;
● Guide and promote the development of labour-intensive succession industries in resourcedepleted areas;
● Prevent and resolve mass incidents in the process of cutting overcapacity. (NDRC, et al.,
2017; NDRC, et al., 2018; 2019; 2020).
These resettlement policies have had some positive impacts on coal workers and communities.
According to a survey of coal companies in Henan province, part of the workers who were from
exited coal mines were resettled to more efficient large coal mines, or to large manufacturing plants
such as Foxconn through a corporate partnership scheme, while a large number of workers also
entered the tertiary sector with interest-free loans provided by enterprises to start their own
businesses (Fu et al., 2017). However, some scholars argue that the past cutting overcapacity has
not brought about significant unemployment and should be mostly attributed to the growth of the
tertiary sector which effectively absorbed the surplus labour (Tang, et al., 2018).
There might be further challenges when the service sector becomes saturated in the future and the
control of total energy consumption and energy use intensity (能效双 控) continues. The policy
framework regarding the re-employment of people working in energy-intensive industries
including coal-related industries is still in the pipeline in the era of transitioning to carbon peaking
by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. The rapid growth of the renewable energy industry is
expected to generate a large number of jobs. According to the IEA’s roadmap, the employment
would increase by 3.6 million in clean energy supply in China by 2030 based on its Accelerated
Transition Scenario (ATS), while decreasing employment in fossil fuel supply and fossil fuel power
plants by 2.3 million, which means a nearly one million net increase in jobs (IEA, 2021d)
(compared with Announced Pledges Scenario). 27 However, workers who exit the fossil fuel
industry do not necessarily have the skill sets to go directly into the new energy industry. There are
more real-world challenges that need to be solved, including not only the overall just transition
strategy at the central level, but also the more specific just transition programs at the local level,
which are more relevant to and more easily held accountable by stakeholders in each region.
3.2 The European Union
3.2.1 The Just Transition Mechanism
“Leaving no one behind” is a core concept standing in the ambitious European Green Deal, which
aims to involve all sectors in all countries in the transition towards climate-neutrality, especially for
those coal-reliant economies that are socially vulnerable to the EU emissions reduction targets.
The Just Transition Mechanism is a framework built under this philosophy providing support to
help regions that are most affected by the green transformation, namely those hard-to-decarbonize

The “4050” group refers to women over 40 years old and men over 50 years old who have not yet reached
retirement age or conditions but have difficulty getting employed,
http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/content_2725941.htmhttps://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%9B%9B%E9%9B%B
6%E4%BA%94%E9%9B%B6.
27
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), – the Announced Pledges Scenario – reflects the enhanced
targets China announced in 2020, and the Accelerated Transition Scenario refers to a faster transition.
26
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regions to mitigate the socio-economic impact through mobilizing approximately EUR 55 billion
during the period 2021-2027 (EC, 2021b).
The financing of the Just Transition Mechanism consists of three key parts as shown in Graph 2.
As the first pillar of the Just Transition Mechanism, the Just Transition Fund is operated under
the European Cohesion policy aiming to reduce the divergence between EU countries. This fund
contains EUR 17.5 billion, of which EUR 7.5 billion comes from the EU budget for 2021-2027
and the remaining EUR 10 billion from the externally allocated revenues of the European
Recovery Instrument, namely the NextGenerationEU, an instrument designed to counteract the
socio-economic devastation of the EU brought about by Covid-19 (EC, 2021b). Meanwhile,
member states could also transfer their national allocations under the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) as Just Transition Fund
additional resources. A portion of the funds will be used for skill upgrading and retraining of
workers, job-search assistance and “active inclusion of jobseekers programmes” (EC, 2021c).
The Just Transition Scheme under InvestEU is the second pillar of the Mechanism. It would be
seen as a leveraging agent for private and public capital to support a wider range of projects that
have an approved just transition plan, including social infrastructure projects. Through the
InvestEU financial products proposed by its implementing partners and the InvestEU Advisory
Hub, which is a pipeline of projects, the InvestEU promotes financially feasible investments by
private and public sector entities to help make a green and equitable transition in targeted regions
(EC, 2021d). The third pillar, Public Sector Loan Facility, includes a grant of EUR 1.5 billion from
the EU budget and a loan of EUR 10 billion from the European Investment Bank (EIB). This
Facility looks to mobilise public investment of between EUR 25 and EUR 30 billion to invest in
green, clean and just public infrastructure, including social infrastructure. The project may also
integrate other financing partners in the future (EC, 2021e).
The Territorial Just Transition Plans help identify the eligible EU countries and regions for the
support from the Just Transition Mechanism, and the eligibility will be evaluated by the European
Commission based on the country’s national energy and climate strategies (EC, 2021b; World
Resources Institute, 2021a). Meanwhile, the Just Transition Platform offers technical assistance to
the EU countries in drafting the Territorial Just Transition Plans based on the status quo of specific
regions (EC, 2021b). The Platform was developed on the foundation of the Initiative for Coal
Regions in Transition, which has contributed to gather all coal-relevant stakeholders including
governments at all levels from EU coal regions, enterprises, trade unions, nonprofits and academic,
as a bottom-up dialogue mechanism (EC, 2021f; WRI, 2021a).
Currently, 100 regions have been identified as eligible for financial aid from the Just Transition
Fund and are considered more vulnerable to the green transition. As of December 2021, the top
recipients of the Just Transition Fund are Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and
Romania (EC, 2021g). The Just Transition Mechanism could help EU countries that do not have
enough capacity to make a green and just transition on their own to access investments leveraged
from the public and private sectors, with access to science-based guidance. Even if some
investments are not directly utilized with coal workers and coal communities, for them the transfer
of capital and technology creates opportunities for local development and gains a public
understanding of decarbonization (Strambo, 2020). However, while it is claimed that social
infrastructure, vocational training for workers, etc. are included, the extent to which this
mechanism is able to engage coal communities and coal industry workers, or, to what extent the
mechanism is people-centered remains in question. There is criticism that much of the funding
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being provided will go towards research and innovation rather than directly benefiting affected
workers, and that trade unions are not being fully integrated into the design of the Just Transition
system (Voet, 2020). This is more or less a departure from the original purpose of the mechanism,
which is to provide a targeted labour and welfare policy (Marty, 2020). Though the mechanism
clarifies the need for the EU countries to consult with all stakeholders when completing the
Territorial Just Transition Plans, the mechanism does not ensure that the national government will
make funds available to the regional governments most affected by coal phase out and to coal
communities. Further, there is a lack of attention to the most vulnerable groups - the most
disadvantaged sections of society and low-skilled workers - in the assessment indicators provided
by the Territorial Just Transition Plans (Strambo, 2020).
Graph 2 – The Model of the EU’s Just Transition Mechanism

Just Transition Mechanism

InvestEU “Just Transition”
Scheme

Just Transition Fund

European
Commission

Eligible countries and
regions
Approval

Public Sector Loan Facility

Technical
support

Just Transition
Platform

Territorial Just
Transition Plans

Technical support to
all EU coal regions

Technical support
Source: European Commission – The Just Transition Mechanism: making sure no one is left behind,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/finance-and-green-deal/just-transitionmechanism_en

3.2.2 The European Climate Pact
Another mechanism that could improve the situation of coal workers and coal communities at the
EU level is the European Climate Pact, which aims to increase public participation in green
transition and create an inclusive platform for all stakeholders. Raising awareness and taking action
are the two dimensions of this Pact, with one area of focus for Action prioritized being Green
skills, which mean the skills that are needed for a climate-neutral economy. In order to help
workers up- and reskill, the Pact will launch a Pact for Skills which involves businesses, labour
organisations, educational institutions, etc., to cooperate. It will also build a bridge between
workers and organizations, e.g., Erasmus+ that provides vocational training opportunities, and
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helps workers access the European Social Fund which aims to provide training for 5 million people
on skills needed in the green economy and green recovery. There is also an interaction between
the European Climate Pact and the Just Transition Mechanism, as the Pact will encourage
stakeholders to utilize the Mechanism to help workers develop skills and get involved in a green
economy, as well as create potential employment opportunities in targeted regions (EC, 2021h).
This Pact helps to bring the voices of individuals and groups into policy making and defines
environmental democracy (Dutu-Buzura, 2021), while this could also include the consultation with
coal workers and coal communities. However, it is not designed for just transition, but for broader
climate initiatives. This Pact goes beyond policy and law (Colli, 2021). While it offers a rosy vision
for green skills training, it does not propose detailed measures to implement it in the meantime.
3.3 The United States
3.3.1 From Obama to Trump era
National efforts in the US to target a just transition away from coal began during the Obama
administration when the number of workers in the US coal mining industry was rapidly declining.
The Partnerships for Opportunity Workforce and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative
was launched in 2015 initially to help workers and communities relying on the coal industry adapt
to the fast energy transition away from coal in the US through federal resources, especially in the
Appalachian region (White House, 2015). As a down payment on the broader POWER+ program,
which includes wider social welfare, economic recovery, and technology development (primarily
CCUS) components, this initiative aims to help coal workers and coal communities from several
perspectives: diversifying local business and industry; creating jobs in new and/or existing
industries; attracting new sources of private and public investment; and providing a range of career
services and skills training for jobs needed in the new economy (White House, 2015). From 2016
to 2019, Congress appropriated USD 50 million annually to the initiative through the Appalachian
Regional Commission (ARC) which works on the economic development of the Appalachian
region, including major coal states such as Kentucky, Missouri, West Virginia, etc. All the
applications should also be submitted through the ARC. In recent years, POWER exists only as a
funded program of the ARC (WRI, 2021b). The initiative has achieved considerable success. As
of December 2021, the ARC has invested around USD 294.7 million in 369 projects throughout
354 coal-impacted communities with over 35,300 jobs created and USD 1.5 billion in additional
private investment leveraged. In September 2021, the ARC made a new announcement of nearly
USD 46.4 million for 57 projects in 184 counties to support coal-impacted communities in the
Appalachian region to diversify the local economy (ARC, 2021).
The POWER Initiative’s ability to secure congressional appropriations demonstrates a bipartisan
interest in federal assistance to populations impacted by the energy transition in the US. However,
though it was proposed at the federal level, the POWER Initiative is currently restricted to the
Appalachian region and has not undergone an evaluation by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO). More funds need to be mobilized, more regions need to be included for coal
workers and communities in the energy transition (Cecire, 2019; WRI, 2021b).
The POWER Initiative provided an important foundation to a just transition and continued to
work under the Trump administration. President Trump claimed to revive the coal industry and
bring back coal mining jobs. His efforts, however, have been primarily on easing environmental
review of coal projects, rather than on helping the transformation of coal communities inevitably
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in decline. Further, President Trump’s fiscal year 2018 budget cut the federal economic and
workforce development programs which were set up to support coal communities impacted by
the energy transition, which include the POWER Initiative. This went against his campaign
promises to coal workers and coal communities (Bassett, Walsh, 2017; Partridge, Betz, 2017).
3.3.2 Just transition policies under Biden administration
Fulfilling the obligation to the fossil fuel workers and communities stands as one key element in
President Biden’s Plan For A Clean Energy Revolution since his election campaign. Among his campaign
promises, he designed a benefits system for coal workers’ health care and conceived a task force
to help fossil energy-reliant communities access federal investments and mobilize private sector
investments to complete the transition and create decent jobs, as well as provide training for
workers. 28 Soon after the inauguration, on 27 January 2021, President Biden’s Executive Order on
Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad lists a number of items to actively and purposefully
assist coal workers and communities. The section Empowering Workers Through Revitalizing Energy
Communities makes clear that the Biden administration will develop favorable policies targeting
economic revitalization and investment in communities affected by the clean energy economy as
well as job creation and social benefits securing, etc. 29
An Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Coal and Power Plant Communities and Economic
Revitalization which is co-chaired by the Director of the National Economic Council and the
National Climate Advisor, and administered by the Secretary of Energy, was established under the
Executive Order. In April, the IWG released its Initial Report to the President, in which it identified
“25 most impacted regions for coal-related declines” as “priority energy communities”. According
to the IWG, nearly USD 38 billion federal funding is available to the energy community (White
House, 2021a).
Other plans and announcements are also mentioning empowerment of traditional energy
communities and opportunity creation, including President Biden’s American Jobs Plan (White
House, 2021b), the Department of Energy’s announcement to invest USD 109.5 Million to
support energy jobs (Department of Energy, 2021), the Department of Commerce’s Economic
Development Administration (EDA)’s USD 300 million Coal Communities Commitment, and the
Department of Agriculture’s USD 167 million for energy communities (White House, 2021c).
These plans and announcements are expected to be mutually bolstered with the IWG’s workplan
as well. Specifically, they all mentioned bringing employment opportunities through job creation
“infrastructure projects”, “pollution mitigation and environmental remediation”, “next generation
industries” as well as “securing benefits and opportunity for energy workers” by workforce training
and empowerment, etc (White House, 2021a).
At the legislative level, In addition to the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (White House, 2021d), which
was passed by Congress, the ongoing “Build Back Better” legislation in Congress includes many
initiatives to fund infrastructure and support communities impacted by the clean energy transition.
In particular, the text of the legislation passed by the House Energy and Commerce Committee
proposes USD 2 billion within a 10-year timeframe for low-carbon investments in the energy
28

This is based on the Biden Plan For A Clean Energy Revolution And Environmental Justice,
https://joebiden.com/9-key-elements-of-joe-bidens-plan-for-a-clean-energy-revolution/
29
This is based on the Biden Plan For A Clean Energy Revolution And Environmental Justice,
https://joebiden.com/9-key-elements-of-joe-bidens-plan-for-a-clean-energy-revolution/
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community (Section 1706), and it contains retraining for workers and recovery for communities
(Cahill, Pai, 2021). However, the specifics and numbers that will be in the final budget have not
yet been determined. The “Build Back Better” framework, together with the Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law, are expected to add an average of 1.5 million jobs per year over the next 10 years (White
House, 2021d).
With Biden’s concurrent goals of reducing emissions by 50-52% compared with 2005 levels by
2030 and decarbonizing the power sector by 2035 (White House, 2021e), whether coal workers
and communities will be the victims or the beneficiaries of clean energy jobs as Biden called for is
still unknown in the short term. According to interviews, Biden’s infrastructure plan is gaining
support from coal workers and communities, as they agreed on the plan to leave the mines in
exchange for “green jobs” proposed in Biden’s policies (Daly, 2021; Egan, 2021). However, critics
argue that the Biden administration’s outreach efforts may not be enough. A just transition requires
a mechanism for sustained dialogue with diverse stakeholders, yet applications for funding have a
very tight timeline for projects to be elaborated (Cahill, Pai, 2021). It is also a challenge for the
Biden administration to make their transition economy more compelling. Each region that has
relied on coal in the past needs a detailed assessment for the direction of economic transformation,
and the determination for the new industry that could bring long-term sustainable development is
complex. In addition, the income from “green jobs” is not necessarily more attractive than that
from fossil fuels jobs, which can be a disincentive for workers and communities to embrace the
green transition (Colman, Adragna, 2021).
4. Discussion and Conclusion
The different just transition policies away from coal in China, the EU, and the US show that there
is often no one-size-fits-all just transition solution worldwide, and the policy-making of just
transition often depends on politics, economic models, financing methods and social governance.
There are some similarities and differences between the just transition policies of China, the EU
and the US to move away from coal, as summarized in Table 6 and explained below.
Table 6 – The respective characteristics of just transition policies in China, the EU and the US
Philosophy in just transition

Financial sources

Detailed measures

China
Stabilize employment
and ensure living
standards.
Public sector-funded;
“government-backed,
market-supported”.

Maintain the living
standards of groups
with hardship backed
by the government
financial support;
Training for workers
and entrepreneurship
incubation;
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European Union
Leave no one behind,

United States
Environmental justice.

Public sector-funded and
private sector mobilized;
Funds from public and
private sectors are both
main pillars.
Training for workers and
entrepreneurship
incubation; Industrial
transformation and
economic revival for coal
regions.

Public sector-funded and
private sector mobilized;
Funds from public and
private sectors are both
main pillars.
Training for workers and
entrepreneurship
incubation; Industrial
transformation and
economic revival for coal
regions; job creation by
the climate strategy and
green economy.
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Level of public participation

Resettlement of
workers to other
positions;
government ensuring
employment through
the partnership with
enterprises and public
service jobs; Promote
local industrial
tranformation.
Follows a “topdown” approach and
direct governmentstakeholder dialogue
is less mentioned.

Follows a “bottom-up”
model and utilizes the
EU’s Climate Pact to
create a public
participation platform.

Follows a “bottom-up”
model and emphasizes
the consultation with all
stakeholders.

Putting people at the centre of the energy transition and ensuring inclusiveness and justice in the
coal phase out have been mentioned in the central political leadership of all three blocs. As for
China, in the campaign to cut overcapacity by 2020, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang referred to the
need to avoid “zero-employment households”, and a number of guidance documents issued by
ministries mentioned “employee resettlement” as a top priority. Following China’s proposal to
become carbon neutral by 2060, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasised the need to achieve
equity and justice in the green transformation in 2021. The EU has established the pillars of just
transition through the European Green Transition legislation. Under the mantra “leave no one
behind”, the EU has developed the Just Transition Scheme as a resource tool and financing
platform to ensure a just transition across all sectors in all EU member states. The European
Climate Pact is also a voice for coal workers and communities negatively impacted by the energy
transition. In the US, under the Biden administration, both the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and
“Build Back Better” legislation clarify just transition, environmental justice, and investing in
communities. However, compared with the EU and the US, China does not yet have a clear
framework or legislation to ensure a just transition in coal phase out or energy transition.
These three blocs have invested significant financial resources in people-centered coal retirement
policies and a just transition. China has set up an RMB 100 billion special fund to support cutting
overcapacity, with a focus on employee resettlement. The EU’s Just Transition Mechanism
includes a EUR 17.5 billion Just Transition Fund, as well as EUR 13.3 billion in grants and loans
through other channels. The US POWER Initiative and the federal government’s announced
federal resources into communities affected by the energy transition since Biden took office have
also been significant. However, the source of funding is different. China’s special fund of RMB
100 billion comes solely from the transfer payment of the Ministry of Finance. The EU’s Just
Transition Mechanism is funded not only from the EU budget but also from the European
Recovery Instrument, as well as from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the
European Social Fund Plus (ESF+). Meanwhile, the Mechanism actively leverages public sector
funds and private sector funds through InvestEU and the Public Sector Loan Facility, seeking to
expand funding sources from multiple sources. The US POWER Initiative has also successfully
leveraged more than USD 1.5 billion from private sector investment into the Appalachian region’s
economy. However, as mentioned in the survey on the cutting overcapacity of coal plants in Henan,
there were manufacturing companies that directly employed coal workers who had left the closed
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coal mining capacity through partnerships. But China’s just transition is more of a “governmentbacked, market-supported” model, with the government playing a leading role and the market
playing a supporting role. This may be due to the fact that the Chinese government has a strong
central fiscal system that can provide a backstop for the resettlement of workers during the cutting
overcapacity process. It is worth noting that although multiple sources of financing to pay for
unemployment insurance are mentioned in the policy document, the emphasis is still on the
fundamental role of government finance. In the EU, however, the use of funds often requires
cumbersome negotiations among member states. This might be why the final budget approved for
the Just Transition Fund, EUR 17.5 billion, was much smaller than the EUR 40 billion budget in
the European Commission’s original proposal in January 2020 (the outbreak of Covid-19 is also
one cause) (WRI, 2021a). Also, the U.S. budget for federal funds requires bipartisan approval in
Congress. This is often politically difficult because the budget being discussed for coal
communities might be dropped as other political issues are prioritized by the two major parties.
The details of the policies to achieve a just transition in China, the EU, and the US are similar and
different. All three blocs emphasized training for workers, especially for the skills needed for jobs
in the new green economy. All three blocs also stressed support for entrepreneurship for coal
workers. China stresses the government’s role in ensuring stable employment, i.e., resettling
workers to other possible positions; mobilizing enterprises throughout society to provide possible
positions for workers leaving the coal industry, and the government itself provides a number of
jobs of a public interest nature. This establishes an overall plan that is macro and tries to directly
address the employment of industrial workers in a more flexible way. Such a plan would transmit
pressure to local governments through China’s upwardly accountable central-local relations and
target responsibilities to develop locally tailored goals and solutions (Lu, et al., 2021). However,
this approach is difficult to achieve in both the EU and the US, which have different political
systems. Both the EU and the US mentioned accelerating clean industrial transformation and
economic revival for coal communities and regions through green jobs. In particular, the US just
transition plan places emphasis on the increased, higher-value jobs that a clean energy revolution
can bring to workers in traditional fossil energy industries. In its 2017 coal and steel cutting
overcapacity policy, China mentioned the development of labour-intensive industries in resourcedepleted regions to take on labour. Yet support for the green economy was not stressed at this
stage. Currently, China’s industrial transformation program in the era of carbon peaking and
carbon neutrality is not yet directly linked to the just transition. In addition, China’s policies often
place high attention on social security support for people in special hardship (e.g. 4050 group,
zero-employment households, etc.), probably because China is still a developing country with
relatively low per capita disposable income and a developing social welfare system compared to
EU countries and the US.
The levels of public participation varied among the three blocs in the just transition away from
coal. There is little mention of direct government-stakeholder dialogue in China’s policies related
to cutting overcapacity in the coal industry. The need for the government to prevent and defuse
mass incidents in the process of de-capacitation, however, was highlighted in the relevant policies.
Although some interviews mentioned a series of consultations by coal companies in understanding
workers’ future intentions for resettlement, a public participation mechanism for just transition
has not yet been established. This may be due to the fact that China’s energy and climate
governance model favors a “top-down” approach (Lu, et al., 2021). In contrast, both the EU and
the US emphasize the values of environmental democracy and environmental justice and have
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adopted some form of “bottom-up” participation in energy and climate governance. The EU’s
Climate Pact legislates legal ways for citizens to participate, and the US Interagency Working
Group (IWG) on Coal and Power Plant Communities and Economic Revitalization has conducted
lengthy communications with stakeholders in various states in the way of workshops.
This paper presents some of the current status of the coal sector in China, the EU, the US, and
their just transition policies away from coal, with the aim of illustrating the complexity of the issue
of just transition and explaining the reasons for the differences between the three blocs. However,
the current energy and climate goals and just transition policies of China, the EU and the US are
also evolving and require our continued attention. The significance of comparing these three blocs
is also to demonstrate that with the deepening of the energy transition, a just transition has become
imminent and different countries/regions need to adopt localized policies as soon as possible,
drawing on real-life practices.
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